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Abstract
This paper presents a model inspired by the Unified Growth Theory, where
reductions in adult mortality together with improvements in technological
progress are the deep causes of the transition from a Traditional (Malthu-
sian) Regime to a Pre-Modern Regime, characterized by the accumulation of
fixed capital only, and finally, to a Modern Regime, characterized by the joint
accumulation of both fixed and human capital. A calibrated version of the
model is able to reproduce the dynamics of the UK economy in the period
1541-1914, matching both the periods of transition and the pattern of main
macroeconomic variables. UK growth before the mid-nineteenth century ap-
pears to be mainly due to technological progress, while thereafter, the decline
in adult mortality and factors accumulation played the major role. Finally,
fertility decline during the nineteenth century has only a marginal impact on
growth because it is more than balanced by the increase in adult survival.
Classificazione JEL: O10, O40, I20
Keywords: Unified Growth Theory, Human Capital, Adult mortality, Non-
linear Dynamics, Endogenous Fertility, Industrial Revolution
2 Davide Fiaschi - Tamara Fioroni
Contents
I. Introduction 3
II. Technological Progress and Adult Mortality 5
II.A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
II.B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
III.The Model 8
III.A.Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
III.B.Consumption and Total Transfers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
III.C.Adult Survival and the Optimal Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
III.D.Accumulation of Fixed and Human Capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
IV.The Stages of Development 15
IV.A.The Role of Mortality Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
IV.B.Endogenous Fertility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
IV.C.Empirical Evidence on Fertility and Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
V. A Quantitative Evaluation 22
V.A. Variables and Settings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
V.B. Growth Accounting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
V.C. The Model’s Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
V.C.i. Exogenous Fertility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
V.C.ii. Endogenous Fertility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
VI.Concluding Remarks 33
A Optimal Choices 39
AA. Exogenous Fertility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
AB. Endogenous Fertility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
AC. Optimal Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
AD. Thresholds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
B Proof Prop. 1 42
C Quantitative Exercise 43
CA. Details on Table 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
CB. Details on Table 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
CC. Parameters’calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
CC.i. Exogenous Fertility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
CC.ii. Endogenous fertility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Transition to Modern Growth 3
I. Introduction
In literature there is no agreement on the main determinants of the extraordinary
development in the last five centuries of Western economies and of the related phenomenon
known as the “Great Divergence ”(see Mokyr, 1999).
The aim of this paper is to discuss how reductions in (adult) mortality, together with
improvements in technological progress, affecting the accumulation of human and fixed
capital (and the dynamics of structural change), can be at the root of the long-run growth
of Western countries, with the additional conjecture that the changes in both variables
are driven by exogenous factors to the economy (we refer to Section II. for a detailed
discussion on this point).
We propose a theoretical model in the spirit of the Unified Growth Theory proposed
by Galor (2005), augmented by the presence of adult mortality, fixed (physical) capital
accumulation, and two technologies differing in their inputs; one with only land and un-
skilled labor, the other with fixed (physical) and human capital1, in order to match the
observed structural change during the industrialization of countries (see also Hansen and
Prescott, 2002 and Aghion and Howitt, 2009). We then discuss the ability of a calibrated
version of the model to reproduce the dynamics of main macroeconomic variables (GDP
per worker, investment rate, structural change in output composition, interest rate, invest-
ment in education, fertility rate) of the UK economy in the period 1541-1914, including
the timing of the transition across different regimes (at the end of the eighteenth century
for the transition from Malthusian to Pre-Modern Regime, and in the mid-nineteenth
century for the transition from Pre-Modern to Modern Regime). Finally, we estimate the
contribution of different factors (technological progress, adult mortality, accumulation of
fixed and human capital, workforce) to the overall growth of the UK. The latter appears
mainly due to technological progress before the mid-nineteenth century, while thereafter
the decline in adult mortality and factors accumulation play the major role. The big
change in fertility in the nineteenth century has a negligible impact on growth, because
it appears more than balanced by the increase in adult mortality.
The overlapping generations model considers individuals potentially living for two
periods (childhood and adulthood), with a subsistence consumption, and where the saving
rate is an increasing function of wealth. Individuals arrive at adulthood with certainty
and the risk of mortality occurs during adulthood. Individuals devote the first period of
their life (childhood) to the acquisition of human capital (if any) and in the second period
they allocate their income, given by the sum of their labor income and their (if any)
bequest, between consumption and transfers to their offspring (their transfers are only
positive when their income is above a certain threshold). The transfers (if positive) are
invested in fixed capital and in the children’s education in order to maximize the future
income of children (see Galor and Moav (2004)).
An increase in adult survival has two opposite effects on transfers to the offspring: a
1Here we follow a classical distinction between working (circulating) capital and fixed capital, where the
former consists in short-lived inputs (generally used for just one productive cycle such as raw materials),
and the latter is related to those economic goods “repeatedly used in the course of a number of productive
cycles ”such as machinery (Cipolla, 1994, p. 80). The accelerated accumulation of fixed capital in terms
of their “range and variety ”is one of the most prominent phenomena of the Industrial Revolution (see,
e.g., Hicks, 1969, p.142 and Cipolla, 1994, p. 80).
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negative effect because it raises the lifetime consumption of the parents and a positive
effect because it increases parents’ income (via an increase in their labor income). 2 At low
levels of income the first effect dominates, therefore an increase in adult survival leads to
a reduction in the amount of resources available to future generations; the opposite occurs
at high levels of income. Empirical evidence discussed in Cervellati and Sunde, 2011 (see,
in particular, their Figure 5) on the U-shaped relationship between life expectancy and
the growth rate of income supports this finding.3
The dynamic is characterized by three different regimes: (i) a Traditional (Malthu-
sian) Regime, where output is produced only by a traditional technology, whose factors
are unskilled labor and land; (ii) a Pre-Modern Regime, where an increasing share of ag-
gregate output is produced using fixed capital and unskilled labor in an industrial sector;
and, finally, (iii) a Modern Regime where both fixed and human capital are used in the
industrial sector. The transition from the Traditional to the Pre-Modern, and, finally, to
the Modern Regime can either be the result of an ongoing progress in the technological
progress alone, or it can be the joint effect of an increase in technological progress and
adult survival. On the other hand, at low levels of income (technological progress), a de-
crease in adult survival can alone help the transition from a Traditional to a Pre-Modern
Regime (and viceversa).
The introduction of endogenous fertility does not substantially affect the main results
of the paper, but just adds a possible self-reinforcing mechanism to the stability and
transition from one regime to the other. The Traditional Regime assumes the typical
characteristic of a Malthusian Regime (as it is denoted in the Unified Growth Theory),
where increases in income are checked by increases in the population. Once a country es-
capes from the Malthusian Regime the decreasing fertility with respect to income further
boosts the country’s growth by increasing its accumulation of fixed and human capital. In
the calibrated version of the model for the UK, the matching between simulated and ob-
served fertility rate is the most problematic feature, suggesting that a more sophisticated
theory is needed in line with the remark made by Easterlin (2004).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the related literature; Section 3
presents the model; Section 4 studies the transitions between regimes; Section 5 calibrates
the model to the UK economy for the period 1541-1914; and Section 6 concludes.
2Many theoretical contributions find only a positive effect on growth of gains in life expectancy through
various channels; see, for example, Cervellati and Sunde, 2005, Boucekkine et al., 2003, Soares, 2005, De
la Croix and Licandro, 1999, Lagerlof, 2003, Weisdorf, 2004, and Bar and Leukhina, 2010). Some recent
contributions argue for a positive effect on long-run growth of negative shocks on life expectancy (see
Voigtlander and Voth (2013)).
3In particular, Cervellati and Sunde (2011) find a negative effect before the demographic transition
(not necessarily related to the level of income), and a strong and positive effect on the next period. On the
other hand, Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) argue that improvements in life expectancy, rising population
growth, have a negative effect on GDP per capita. Our paper may help to reconcile these (apparently)
conflicting results by adding some insight on the conditions under which improvements in life expectancy
are good for the long-run growth of a country.
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II. Improvements in Technological Progress and the Decline in Adult Mor-
tality
The literature on deep explanation(s) for long-run growth of Western countries in the
last 500 years is enormous and still increasing.
Following a long tradition in economics dating back to Joseph Schumpeter, Aghion and
Howitt (2009) attribute the main explanatory factors for country growth to the economic
incentives that stimulate innovation activity (such as the profits for innovators). Other
scholars (see, e.g., Lucas, 1988), following a literature starting in 1960’ (see, e.g., Cipolla,
1962), point to the accumulation of human capital. Moreover, other scholars point to the
quality of institutions forged by environment and individual incentives (Acemoglu et al.,
2001).4 Finally, some authors relate the increases in the stock of knowledge available in
the economy to the size of population, so that they identify a direct causal relationship
between the size (or the growth rate) of the population and technological progress (see
Kremer, 1993 and Galor, 2005). These explanations can also be seen as complementary
and applicable to different periods and time scale of analysis (e.g., the Schumpterian
theory applied to post First World War, the theory of knowledge accumulation applied to
the very long run).5 Common to this literature is however the search for an endogenous
(mainly economic) explanation for countries’ growth.
In this paper we take a different route, and consider the improvements in technological
progress and adult survival as the result of some factors exogenous to the economic sphere.
We argue that this approach is the most suited to our objective of explaining the transition
of European countries, in particular the UK, through different regimes of growth from 1541
to 1914. As we will discuss below, the debate looks at the key source(s) of the Industrial
Revolution and of the decline of adult mortality during the second half of the nineteenth
century.6
The dynamic of European economies after 1914 is beyond the scope of the paper
because they are probably related to a more sophisticated theory of innovation, accumu-
lation of human capital, and of economic factors affecting the countries’ health sector (in
particular, the impact of public health systems).
II.A. Improvements in Technology Progress
In the paper we adhere to the idea that the Industrial Revolution is the result of the
cultural revolution during the 17th century (Koyre, 1961, Cipolla, 1994, Rosenberg,
1994, Mokyr, 2002, Mokyr, 2010, Jacob and Stewart, 2004).
Starting from the perspective that “... the origins of the Industrial Revolution reach
4For example, Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that the lower settler mortality in North America with
respect to Center and Southern America has led to institutions being more favourable to investment.
5But the prevalence of one or the other has crucially different policy implications. For example, if the
quality of institutions is the key factor of development, then the adoption of Western institutions (e.g.
democracy) is the main policy recommendation to poor countries; in a different way, if human capital
is crucial attention should be on all the factors favoring the accumulation of human capital (e.g., public
expenditure in education). Finally, if incentives to innovate is crucial an efficient patent law system is
needed.
6Mokyr (1999) provides an extensive survey of the debate on the causes and nature of the Industrial
Revolution, while a survey on the causes of the decline in mortality can be found in Livi Bacci (2007).
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back to that profound change in ideas, social structures, and value systems ...”(see Cipolla,
1994, p. 227) of the last part of the Middle Ages, we agree with Mokyr (2002) that the
Industrial Revolution is mainly the result of a cultural revolution caused by the emergence
of the new scientific method elaborated in the 17th century which particularly permeated
English society during the 18th and 19th centuries : “... the interconnections between
the Industrial Revolution and those parts of Enlightenment movement that sought to
rationalize and spread knowledge may have played a more important role than recent
writings have given them credit for ... This would explain the timing of Industrial Rev-
olution following the Enlightenment and - equally important - why it did not fizzle out
like similar bursts of macroinvention in earlier times. It might also help explain why the
Industrial Revolution takes place in western Europe ... ”(see Mokyr, 2002, p. 29). The
same conclusion is present in Jacob and Stewart (2004), who highlight the importance of
the change in approach of individuals to scientific knowledge, which “becomes a center-
piece of Western culture, a partner with industry, ...” (see Jacob and Stewart, 2004, p.
8).
We are aware that other more materialistic explanations have been proposed (see,
e.g, Cipolla, 1994, and Allen, 2009), but discontinuity is the major challenge for all these
explanations (Clark, 2007, p. 228).
Finally, Solow (2000, p. 97) discusses the pros and cons of the theories which aim to
endogenize technological progress in contrast to the hypothesis of exogenous technological
progress at the root of the traditional Solovian growth model. In particular, he argues how
the development of a general and convincing framework is still to be reached, stressing
how it is very reasonable to consider changes in technological progress as exogenous but
not necessarily constant over time, and highlighting the importance of analyzing how
the economy reacts to these changes. These same issues are also discussed in (Acemoglu,
2008, p. 414), where the issue is posed in terms “whether innovation is mainly determined
by scientific constraints and stimulated by scientific breakthroughs ... or whether is, at
least in part, driven by profit motives”. Acemoglu concludes in favor of a role of profits
in innovation (at least for developed countries after the Second World War).7
II.B. The Decline in Mortality
In accordance with our perspective on technological progress, decline in mortality
beginning in the mid-nineteenth century is assumed to have the same exogenous root of
the Industrial Revolution (see Mokyr, 1991 and 2010; Preston, 1975 and 1996; Easterlin,
2004; Livi Bacci, 2007; Ljungberg, 2013, Deaton, 2006). In particular, in the words of some
of the most important scholars in the field “What the Mortality and Industrial Revolutions
have in common is that they are both manifestations of the explosion in empirically based
human knowledge, scientific and technological, that dates from the seventeenth century
onward ”(see Easterlin, 2004, p. 97); and, more precisely, “... the essential element in the
gains was an enormous scientific breakthrough - the germ theory of disease”(see Preston,
1996, p. 6). Therefore, it is possible to conclude that “[The dominant factors of] The
mortality decline of the period since 1850 ... probably include social and cultural factors
7From another point of view McCloskey (1995) discusses how the attempt by many economists to
endogenize technological progress can be justified not in the empirical evidence in favor of such possibility,
but in the current way of conducting research in the field of economics.
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(methods of child rearing, personal hygiene, improved organization of markets, and so
forth) in the first phase of transition ... ” (see Livi Bacci, 2007, p. 124).
The sources of mortality decline have been extensively debated by historical demogra-
phers, historians of medicine and economic historians (see Schofield et al., 1991). Accord-
ing to McKeown (1976), the principal cause of mortality decline in England from 1838 to
the current day was modern economic growth which, by increasing living standards, and
particularly the nutritional level of the population, inevitably increased resistance of the
population to infectious diseases.
However, subsequent research has shown empirical evidence which contradicts McK-
eown’s theory. As Livi Bacci (2007) asserts “This theory is countered by a number of
considerations which make us look to other causes. In the first place, the link between
nutrition and resistance to infection holds primarily in cases of severe malnutrition; and
while these were frequent during periods of want, in normal years the diet of European
populations seems to have been adequate. Second the latter half of the eighteenth cen-
tury and the first decade of nineteenth, the period during which this mortality transition
began, do not appear to have been such a fortunate epoch.”(see Livi Bacci (2007), p.71).
Moreover, Livi Bacci (2007) argues that the increase in longevity was caused principally
by a reduction in young and infant mortality which occurred “not because of better nu-
trition, but because of improved child-rearing methods and better protection from the
surrounding environment.”(see Livi Bacci (2007) p.71).
In his 2004 book Robert Fogel emphasizes the strict relationship between better nu-
trition and mortality reduction; however, he finds evidence of a very limited or even
opposing relationship between economic growth and improvement in nutritional status
and health during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in both Europe and America8.
In particular, Fogel points out that “The overall improvement in health and longevity
during this period is less than might be expected from the rapid increases in per capita
income indicated by national income accounts for most of the countries in question. More
puzzling are the decades of sharp decline in height and life expectancy, some of which
occurred during eras of undeniably vigorous economic growth. ”(see Fogel (2004) p. 18).
With respect to more recent years, i.e. from 1900 to 1960, Preston (1975) finds that
economic growth explains only 10− 25 percent of the increase in life expectancy whereas
the remaining 75 − 90 per cent of the growth in life expectancy is attributable to fac-
tors exogenous to countries’ levels of income. In particular, he emphasizes the crucial
role of the widespread diffusion of medical innovation in reducing mortality: “It seems
to have been predominantly broad-gauged public health programmes of insect control,
environmental sanitation, health education and maternal and child health services that
transformed the mortality picture in less developed areas, while it was primarily specific
vaccines, antibiotics and sulphonamides in more developed areas. But the technologies
were not, for the most part, indigenously developed by countries in either group. Universal
values assured that health breakthroughs in any country would spread rapidly to all others
where the means for implementation existed. The importance of exogenous, largely im-
ported, health technology in the now-developed countries may have been underestimated
8See also Deaton (2006) “In Britain, the United States, and much of Europe, there were periods in the
nineteenth century when urbanization ran ahead of the rate of public health provision and population
health deteriorated during periods of rapid economic growth.”(Deaton, 2006, p. 111)
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for earlier periods as well.”(see Preston, 1975, p. 243).
Fig.1 supports Preston’s conclusion that factors not related to income explain the rise
in life expectancy. The left panel of Fig.1 shows that the same level of GDP per capita
is associated with different levels of life expectancy, while the right panel of Fig. 1 shows
that, in a given year, the differences in life expectancy across countries are low.
The left panel of Fig. 1 shows a marked increase in life expectancy from the end of
the nineteenth century, that is the period in which, according to Easterlin (2004), the so-
called Mortality Revolution started9. In particular Easterlin (2004) asserts “Since 1870,
life expectancy at birth in many areas of the world has soared from values around 40
years or less to 70 years or more. The reduction in mortality has been accompanied by
an associated improvement in health as the incidence of contagious disease has dramat-
ically lessened. This lengthening of life and associated reduction in morbidity brought
about by the Mortality Revolution has meant at least as much for human welfare as the
improvement in living levels due to modern economic growth. Certainly the Mortality
Revolution has substantially affected a much wider segment of the world’s population.
”(see Easterlin, 2004, p.84). Thus, Easterlin (2004) argues that the rise in life expectancy
principally depends on the emergence and increasing importance of medical and techno-
logical innovations (see Easterlin, 2004, p. 86).10
III. The Model
The model is inspired by Galor and Moav (2004). Consider an economy populated
by overlapping generations of people who potentially live for two periods: childhood and
adulthood. They certainly live in childhood but are subject to a risk of dying during
adulthood. Denote the expected length of adulthood in period t by pt ∈ (0, 1), the total
number of adults at the beginning of period t by Lt, and therefore the actual aggregate
labor supply in the period t is equal to ptLt.
III.A. Production
In every period, the economy produces a single material good, whose price is nor-
malized to 1. Production may take place using two different technologies: a traditional
technology that employs unskilled labor and land, and an industrial technology that em-
ploys fixed capital and skilled labor. While the traditional technology is always operating,
the industrial technology, as we shall see below, will become available once technology has
sufficiently progressed (for the production structure we follow Aghion and Howitt, 2009).
The traditional production function is given by:
Y at = A
a
t (ptL
a
t )
1−λ(T )λ, (1)
9The uniqueness of the development of scientific medicine in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
is also well documented in the history of medicine as, for example, by Dixon (1978), Watts (2003) and
Porter (2006).
10In particular, he identifies three major breakthroughs which bring about mortality reduction: 1) new
methods of preventing the transmission of disease, including clean water supply and education in personal
hygiene; 2) new vaccines to prevent certain diseases which started in the 1890’s; and 3) new drugs to cure
infectious diseases (antimicrobials) which started in the late 1930’s (see Easterlin, 2004, p. 104 and also
Deaton, 2006, p. 110).
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Figure 1: Life expectancy at birth versus GDP per capita and over time (1750-1930). Non-
parametric kernel smoother. Sources: GDP per capita from Maddison Project Database
(MPD) (update 02/2013); life expectancy at birth from the Human Mortality Database
(HMD) (update 02/2013).
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where λ ∈ (0, 1), Aa is a productivity parameter, pLat is the actual amount of unskilled
labor employed in the traditional sector in the period t and T is the quantity of land. The
industrial production function is given by:
Y mt = At(pthtL
m
t )
1−αKαt , (2)
where α ∈ (0, 1), A > 0 is a technological parameter, and pthtL
m is the actual amount
of skilled labor employed in the industrial sector given by the individual level of human
capital and the actual labor force ptL
m
t . As established below, human capital increases
with the resources invested in education, and when these resources are zero ht(0) = 1 and
therefore the industrial sector employs unskilled labor.
When production is conducted using only traditional technology the wage rate is given
by:
wat = (1− λ)A
a
t p
1−λ
t (L
a
t )
−λT λ. (3)
When industrial technology is operating the rate of return to capital rt and the wage
rate per efficiency unit of labor wmt are given by:
rt = αAtp
1−α
t
(
Kt
htLmt
)α−1
; (4)
wmt = (1− α)Atp
1−α
t
(
Kt
htLmt
)α
. (5)
In the early stages of development production is conducted using traditional tech-
nology while industrial technology is latent since no fixed and human capital have been
accumulated yet. The economy will start employing the industrial technology together
with the traditional technology when income is sufficiently high. In particular, as dis-
cussed below, the improvements in technological progress and adult survival will lead
parents to leave a positive transfer to their children under the form of investments in
fixed capital and education; this, in turn, will activate industrial technology.
Total output is therefore given by:
Yt = Y
a
t + Y
m
t . (6)
Workers are assumed to be perfectly mobile between the two sectors; therefore wages
are equalized across the sectors in every period, i.e. wat = w
m
t ht ∀t. This implies that
employment in the traditional sector is chosen in order to maximize profits (excluding the
return to land), i.e. Lat = argmax[A
a(ptL
a
t )
1−λ(T )λ − wmhtL
a
t ], i.e.:
Lat =
[
Aat p
1−λ
t (1− λ)
wmt ht
]1/λ
T. (7)
The amount of labor employed in the industrial sector is therefore:
Lmt = Lt − L
a
t , (8)
where Lt is the size of the working population. Assuming for simplicity that:
α = λ,
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and that the productivity in the traditional sector has the same trend as the productivity
in the industrial sector, that is:
Aat = ϕAt,
with ϕ < 1, the aggregate production is given11:
Yt = Atp
1−α
t L
1−α
t
(
T˜ + h
( 1−αα )
t Kt
)α
, (12)
where T˜ = ϕ1/αT .
The actual income per worker in period t is therefore given by:
yt = Atp
1−α
t
(
T˜
Lt
+ h
( 1−αα )
t kt
)α
, (13)
where yt ≡ Yt/Lt and kt ≡ Kt/Lt.
From Eq. (11) income per worker can be written as follows:
yt = Atpt
[
T˜
(ptLt) lat
]α
, (14)
where 1/lat is a proxy for the accumulation of fixed and human capital.
III.B. Consumption and Total Transfers
In childhood, individuals acquire education and make no decisions; in adulthood,
individuals work, have nt children, and can save to accumulate wealth for their offspring,
and invest in their education.
To analyze adults’ behavior it is useful to conceptualize adulthood (of length pt) as
divided into time increments (for example years or months). At each time increment
individuals (born in period t − 1) allocate their income between consumption ct and a
transfer to their offspring bt:
yt = ptct + ptbt. (15)
11Substituting Eq. (5) into Eq. (7) leads to:
Lat =
[
Aat p
1−λ
t (1− λ)(htL
m
t )
α
Atp
1−α
t (1− α)htK
α
t
]1/λ
T ; (9)
with λ = α, it yields:
Lat =
Lmt T˜
Kth
1−α
α
t
. (10)
Thus from Eq. (8) it follows that the labor share in the traditional sector is given by:
lat =
Lat
Lt
=
T˜ /Lt
kth
1−α
α
t + T˜ /Lt
. (11)
It follows that ∂(Lat /Lt)/∂ht < 0, ∂(L
a
t /Lt)/∂kt < 0 and ∂(L
a
t /Lt)/∂T > 0.
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where ptct is the actual consumption during adulthood per individual, ptbt is the actual
transfer which each parent gives to their children during their life.
The transfer ptbt, in turn, is allocated between the actual spending in children’s edu-
cation ptet and the actual saving ptst for the future wealth of their children:
pbt = ptst + ptet. (16)
The investment in education is devoted to increasing children’s human capital. In
particular, each child with a total parental investment in education ptet receives an amount
of e¯t ≡ ptet/nt and acquires:
ht+1 = h (e¯t) = (1 +De¯t)
γ ,with γ ∈ (0, 1) and D > 0, (17)
efficiency units of human capital, where h (0) = 1, h′ (0) = γD and lim
e¯t→∞
h′ (e¯t) = 0 (see
Galor and Moav, 2004, 2006). Allowing for the case γ ≥ 1 implies that human capital
accumulation alone can generate positive long-run growth. D is a scale parameter.
Individual preferences are defined over a consumption above a subsistence level cmin > 0
and the transfer to their children bt. The expected utility function of altruistic individuals
born in period t− 1 is therefore:12
U = pt[(1− β) log(ct) + β log(bt + θ)], (19)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and θ > 0 implies that children receive a positive
transfer only when parent’s income is sufficiently high (see Eq. (23) below).
Parents choose the level of consumption and the transfer to the offspring so as to
maximize their expected utility, that is:
(c∗t , b
∗
t ) = argmax
ct,bt
{pt[(1− β) log(ct) + β log(bt + θ)]}, (20)
subject to:
yt = ptct + ptbt;
ct ≥ c
min; and
bt ≥ 0.
Assume that the following condition on parameters hold:
cmin <
(1− β)θ
β
, (21)
in order to ensure that for low levels of income optimal consumption is increasing with
income per worker, while optimal bequest is zero (i.e. ymin < ycap). The optimal levels of
12Following Rosen (Rosen) we assume that the expected utility in the second period is given by the
utility of the state “life”which is given by the utility from consumption and the transfer to the children,
and the utility of the state “death”which is given by M and which is assumed to be equal to zero for
simplicity:
U = pt[(1− β) log(ct) + β log(bt + θ)] + (1− p)M, (18)
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Figure 2: Actual transfer versus adult survival
consumption and transfer are given as follows:13
c∗t =


yt
pt
if yt ∈ (y
min, ycap]
(1− β) (yt + ptθ)
pt
if yt ∈ (y
cap,∞)
(22)
and:
b∗t =


0 if yt ∈ (y
min, ycap]
βyt − θ(1− β)pt
pt
if yt ∈ (y
cap,∞)
(23)
where:
ymin = ptc
min, (24)
and:
ycap =
θ(1− β)pt
β
. (25)
III.C. Adult Survival and the Optimal Transfer
Eq.(22) shows that a rise in adult survival in period t, when income is above subsistence
level, increases actual consumption in adulthood, i.e. ∂ptct/∂pt = ∂yt/∂pt+(1−β)θ > 0.
By contrast, the actual transfer pbt has an inverted U-shaped relationship with respect
to adult survival. The decline in adult mortality 1−pt has in fact two opposing effects on
transfer: on the one hand, higher longevity increases parents’ consumption, thus reducing
the overall transfers to their offspring; on the other hand, parents with a longer working
life, experience an increase in their income thus raising the transfers to their offspring.
When the initial level of income is sufficiently high, the latter effect always prevails,
whereas at low levels of income the opposite is true. In particular, from Eq. (13) there
exists a threshold level of adult survival rate denoted by pˆ, such that for pt < (>)pˆ the
13See Appendix A.
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rise in adult survival rate positively (negatively) affects the total transfer to the offspring
(see Fig. 2):
pˆ =
[
β(1− α)At
θ(1− β)
]1/α(
T˜
Lt
+ h
1−α
α
t kt
)
. (26)
This threshold increases with the level of development of the country, i.e. with respect to
At, ht and kt. On the other hand it decreases with respect to the size of workforce Lt.
III.D. Accumulation of Fixed and Human Capital
The transfer is allocated between saving, i.e. accumulation of fixed capital, and edu-
cation, i.e. accumulation of human capital (see Eq. (16)). However, the economy begins
to accumulate fixed capital only when parents are sufficiently rich (i.e. yt > y
cap, see Eq.
(23)) to leave a positive transfer to their offspring; and to accumulate human capital for
a still higher level of income (i.e. yt > y
edu, see Eq. (33) below).
The total fixed capital stock in period t+1 is given by the aggregate saving in period
t:
Kt+1 = Ltptst = Lt (ptbt − ptet) . (27)
Given the fertility rate nt, adult population Lt evolves according to:
Lt+1 = ntLt. (28)
The capital/labor ratio is therefore equal to:
kt+1 = b¯t − e¯t, (29)
where b¯t ≡ ptbt/nt is the actual transfer per child, and e¯t ≡ ptet/nt is the actual investment
in education per child. In particular:
b¯t =
βyt − θ(1− β)pt
nt
(30)
Parents choose the amount to invest in children’s education in order to maximize
the future income of offspring i.e. yt+1. In the early stages of development, when the
productivity in the industrial sector is relatively low with respect to the productivity
in the traditional sector, individuals do not have the incentive to invest in the human
capital of their children. However, the improvements in technological progress and the
accumulation of fixed capital, pushing up the efficiency of industrial technology, will lead
to a positive demand for human capital. From Eqq. (13) and (17) it follows that:
e∗t = argmax
et∈[0,bt]

At+1p1−αt+1
(
T˜
Lt+1
+
(
1 +
Dptet
nt
) γ(1−α)
α
kt+1
)α , (31)
where kt+1 is given by Eq. (29). Eq. (23) shows that the optimal level of education is
positive only if income is sufficiently high, i.e.:
e¯∗t =


0 if yt ∈ [y
min, yedu];
βyt − θ(1− β)pt − b˜nt
(1 +Db˜)nt
if yt ∈ (y
edu,∞)
(32)
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where:
yedu ≡
b˜nt + θ(1− β)pt
β
, (33)
and:
b˜ ≡
α
D(1− α)γ
. (34)
From Eqq. (29) and (32) the capital-labor ratio in period t+ 1 is given by:
kt+1 =


0 if yt ∈ [y
min, ycap] ;
βyt − θ(1− β)pt
nt
if yt ∈ (y
cap, yedu] ;
(
b˜
1 +Db˜
){
1 +D
[
βyt − θ(1− β)pt
nt
]}
if yt ∈ (y
edu,∞) .
(35)
IV. The Stages of Development
Eqq. (23), (32) and (35) allow us to characterize the dynamic of income per worker
in period t+ 1 as follows:
yt+1 =


At+1p
1−α
t+1 T˜
α
(ntLt)α
if yt ∈ (y
min, ycap];
At+1p
1−α
t+1
[
T˜
ntLt
+
βyt − θ(1− β)pt
nt
]α
if yt ∈ (y
cap, yedu];
At+1p
1−α
t+1
{
T˜
ntLt
+ b˜
[
nt +D(βyt − θ(1− β)pt)
nt(1 +Db˜)
] γ(1−α)
α
+1
}α
if yt ∈ (y
edu,+∞).
(36)
The three ranges of yt correspond to i) Traditional Regime, i.e. yt ∈ (y
min, ycap),
where production is conducted using traditional technology; ii) Pre-Modern Regime, i.e.
yt ∈ (y
cap, yedu), where output is the result of using fixed capital and unskilled labor in
an industrial sector; and iii) Modern Regime, i.e. yt > y
edu, where both fixed and human
capital are jointly used in the industrial sector.14
Assumption 1 Income per worker is always higher than the subsistence level, i.e.
ptc
min. If Lt+1 = Lt = L ∀t and pt+1 = pt = p∀t, this implies that (for technical details
see Appendix A):
A ≥ Amin, (37)
where:
Amin ≡ cmin
(
pL
T˜
)α
. (38)
14Simple calculations show a smoothing transition from the Pre-Modern Regime to the Modern Regime,
that is limyt→yEDU− ∂yt+1/∂yt = limyt→yEDU+ ∂yt+1/∂yt.
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Figure 3: Regime and level of technological progress
Proposition 1 states the conditions under which there exists one or more than one
equilibrium in the three regimes, and Fig. 3 provides a graphical exposition of the results
contained in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds, Lt+1 = Lt = L (i.e. nt = 1 ∀t), and
adult survival is constant over time, i.e pt+1 = pt = p ∀t; under some (not so restrictive)
conditions on the model’s parameters reported in Appendix B:
• if A ∈ [Amin, Atra), then there exists one stable equilibrium in the Traditional Regime and
possibly one unstable and one stable equilibrium in the Pre-Modern Regime, where:
Atra ≡
θ (1− β)
β
(
pL
T˜
)α
. (39)
• If A ∈ [Atra, Apre-mod], then there exists one stable equilibrium in the Pre-Modern Regime,
where:
Apre-mod ≡
b˜+ θ (1− β) p
βp1−α
(
T˜ /L+ b˜
)α . (40)
• Finally, if A > Apre-mod there exists just one stable equilibrium in the Modern Regime.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Fig. 3 shows how as A increases the economy will pass through all three regimes.
The transition from the Traditional to the Pre-Modern Regime is driven by the increase
in traditional production, which make possible positive transfers to offspring, the source
of accumulation of fixed capital. The transition from Pre-Modern Regime to Modern
Regime is, instead, driven by the higher accumulation of fixed capital generated by the
increase of productivity in the modern sector, such accumulation, in turn, increases the
return on the investment in human capital, and, therefore, incentivizes this investment.
Once the accumulation of human capital starts, a self-reinforcing mechanism operates to
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Figure 4: Technological progress, adult mortality and transitions through different regimes
(no population growth)
increase further the income per worker. Decreasing returns in the accumulation of human
capital (i.e. γ < 1) limit, in our model, the possibility of a positive long-run growth (see
Robert E. Lucas, 2004 for a similar analysis).
Fig. 3 does not report the case of two stable equilibria for A ∈ [Amin, Atra), which
would appear as a double cross of the curve in the range (ycap, yedu), in addition to the
cross in the range (ymin, ycap]. This case opens the possibility of persistent effects of
transitory shocks .
IV.A. The Role of Mortality Rate in the Transition between Regimes
Fig. (4) shows how different combinations of technological progress and adult mortality
can lead an economy through different regimes (the figure is depicted under the assumption
of no population growth, i.e. Lt = L and nt = 1 ∀t).
Amin and Atra are both increasing and concave with respect to p, while Apre-mod is
decreasing in [0, pT ) and increasing in (pT , 1].15
Consider the case of an economy with a low level of technological progress and a high
mortality rate (i.e. point J in Fig. 4). The transition through the different regimes for
this economy is driven by the simultaneous advances in technological progress and adult
survival. This could be the path followed by most Western countries in the last 500 years
(see Section V. below).
15The level of pT is equal to 1/θ(1− β)Dγ.
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When the level of technological progress is very low, the rise in adult survival alone
cannot permits the transition from Traditional to (Pre-)Modern Regime. Moreover, an
economy in a Pre-Modern Regime could regress back to the Traditional Regime if the
increase in adult survival is sufficiently high; this is the case of the trajectory starting
from point Z.
When the level of technological progress is high enough, and the increase in adult
survival is moderate, the economy can transit from a Pre-Modern to to Modern Regime
(see the trajectory starting from the pointQ). However, a further increase in adult survival
can push the economy back to the Pre-Modern Regime (this is the case of the trajectory
starting from point W ). As discussed in Section III.C. the inverted U-shaped relationship
between adult survival and economic growth derives from the fact that advances in adult
survival have two opposing effects on intergenerational transfers. The basic motivation
underlying this result is the presence of diminishing returns at low levels of income: the rise
in population, due to a decline in mortality, has a less than proportional effect on output
because of the presence of land. When adult survival rises above a certain threshold,
at low levels of income, the rise in income is not sufficient to compensate for the rise in
consumption. On the other hand, at high levels of income economy accumulates fixed
and human capital, and, therefore, the rise in adult survival always allows a level of
income sufficiently high to compensate for the rise in consumption. In particular, for a
sufficiently high income per worker, the rise in longevity increases the return on investment
in education and therefore the higher income perpetuates.
These results are in line with the empirical evidence of a non-linear relationship be-
tween life expectancy and economic growth as discussed in Cervellati and Sunde, 2011.
In particular, they show that this relationship is negative before the onset of demographic
transition and strongly positive thereafter.
Finally, the path starting from the point X in Fig. 4 shows a scenario in which a
dramatic fall in adult survival, caused for example by an epidemic such as the Black
Death, can have a positive effect on income per worker. In this case, the reduction
in the actual workforce, increasing income per worker, pushes the economy from the
Traditional to Pre-Modern Regime. After the shock, however, the economy will go back
into Traditional Regime unless, at the original level of technological progress and adult
mortality, there was also one stable equilibrium in the Pre-Modern Regime.
IV.B. Endogenous Fertility
In the following we extend the model to include endogenous fertility. Individuals
preferences are now defined over consumption, the transfer to offspring, and the total
number of children who survive to adulthood nt (see Easterlin, 2004 and Galor, 2005).
The optimal problem of parents is therefore:
(c∗t , b
∗
t , n
∗
t ) = argmax
ct,bt,nt
{pt[(1− β) log(ct) + ϵ log(nt) + β log(bt + θ)]}, (41)
subject to:
yt = ptct + ptbt + δntyt;
ct ≥ c
min;
bt ≥ 0.
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where δ is the opportunity cost of raising children, that is the fraction of parents time
required in order to raise each child (see Galor, 2005).
Assuming that condition (21) holds16, the optimal levels of consumption, transfer and
number of surviving children are given by:17.
c∗t =


cmin if yt ∈ (y
min, ysub]
(1− β)yt
(1− β + ϵ)pt
if yt ∈ (ysub, y
cap]
(1− β)(yt + ptθ)
(1 + ϵ)pt
if yt ∈ (y
cap,∞)
(42)
and:
b∗t =


0 if yt ∈ (y
min, ycap]
βyt − θ(1− β + ϵ)pt
pt(1 + ϵ)
if yt ∈ (y
cap,∞)
(43)
and:
n∗t =


yt − ptc
min
δyt
if yt ∈ (y
min, ysub]
ϵ
δ(1− β + ϵ)
if yt ∈ (y
sub, ycap]
ϵ(yt + θpt)
δ(1 + ϵ)yt
if yt ∈ (y
cap,∞)
(44)
where ymin = ptc
min and:
ysub =
ptc
min(1− β + ϵ)
1− β
, (45)
and:
ycap =
θ(1− β + ϵ)pt
β
. (46)
Fertility is increasing with income in the first range and reaches its maximum level
in the range yt ∈ (y
sub, ycap], and then declines (see Fig. (5 )). The quality/quantity
trade-off for children discussed in Becker et al. (1990) starts operating at the moment
parents leave a positive transfer to children.
Eq. (44) shows that fertility has also a nonlinear relationship with adult survival; when
income per worker is very low such that consumption is around subsistence level, fertility
decreases with adult survival (the increase in adult survival raises the total amount of
resources needed to maintain consumption at subsistence level). On the contrary, when
income is sufficiently high, i.e. yt > y
cap, fertility increases with adult survival (an increase
in adult survival results in an increase in the number of children through a positive income
effect).
16Condition (21) ensures that ymin < ysub < ycap.
17See Appendix A
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Figure 5: Optimal choices of individuals with endogenous fertility
Fig. 5 highlights how for very low levels of income per worker, i.e. yt < y
sub, con-
sumption is at its subsistence level, the optimal transfer is zero, while the optimal number
of children increases with respect to income per worker: the Traditional Regime there-
fore assumes the typical characteristics of a Malthusian Regime. In Malthusian Regime
any increase in income per worker (due to improvement in technological progress and/or
adult survival) results in a surge of population, which, in presence of diminishing returns
to labor, leads a subsequent fall in income per worker; economy is therefore doomed to
stagnate just above the subsistence level in the long run. Simple calculations show that
in the range yt ∈ (y
min, ysub] there exists a unique stable equilibrium level of income per
worker for which the population growth is zero (i.e. nt = 1), that is:
yMAL =
ptc
min
1− δ
, (47)
to which correspond an equilibrium level of observed adult population18:
ptL
MAL =
[
At(1− δ)
cmin
]1/α
T˜ , (49)
When income increases (due to the increases in technological progress or mortality
reduction) above the level ysub, this allows parents to escape from the subsistence level of
consumption, thus consumption starts to increase and the fertility rate becomes constant.
However, the economy is still in the Malthusian Regime since parents do not have a
sufficient level of income to leave a positive transfer to their children.
If income continues to increase, the constancy of the fertility rate ensures that, at
a certain point, i.e. yt > y
cap, the economy moves into the Pre-Modern Regime where
18Eq. (49) follows from:
Atp
1−α
t
(
T˜
Lt
)α
=
ptc
min
1− δ
. (48)
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parents start to devote a fraction of income for the future wealth of their children and the
relationship between income and population growth becomes negative.
From Eqq. (43) and (44) the dynamic of income per worker can be characterized as
follows:
yt+1 =


At+1p
1−α
t+1 T˜
α
Lαt
(
δyt
yt − ptcmin
)α
if yt ∈ (y
min, ysub];
At+1p
1−α
t+1 T˜
α
Lαt
[
δ(1− β + ϵ)
ϵ
]α
ifyt ∈ (y
sub, ycap];
At+1p
1−α
t+1
[
δ(1 + ϵ)yt
ϵ(yt + θpt)
]α [
T˜
Lt
+
βyt − θ(1− β + ϵ)pt
1 + ϵ
]α
if yt ∈ (y
cap, yedu];
At+1p
1−α
t+1

 T˜Lt
δ(1 + ϵ)yt
ϵ(yt + θpt)
+ b˜
[
ϵ(yt + θpt) +D(βyt − θ(1− β + ϵ)pt)δyt
ϵ(yt + θpt)(1 +Db˜)
] γ(1−α)
α
+1


α
if yt ∈ [y
edu,+∞).
(50)
where:
yedu =
b˜(1 + ϵ) + θ(1− β + ϵ)pedu
β
. (51)
The following Proposition states the conditions under which we observe one or more
than one equilibrium in the three regimes.
Proposition 2 Suppose that adult survival is constant over time, i.e. pt+1 = pt = p,
then:
• If A ∈ [Amin, Atra), then there exists at least one equilibrium in the Traditional
Regime, where Amin is defined in Eq. (38) and:
Atra =
θ(1− β + ϵ)1−α
β
(
ϵpLt
δT˜
)α
. (52)
• If A ∈ [Atra, Apre-mod], then there exists at least one equilibrium in the Pre-Modern
Regime:
Apre-mod =
[b˜(1 + ϵ) + θ(1− β + ϵ)p]1−α[ϵ(b˜+ θp)]α
ψp1−α
(53)
where ψ = βδα(T˜ /L+ b˜)α.
• If A > Apre-mod there exists at least one equilibrium in the Modern Regime.
IV.C. Empirical Evidence on Fertility and Income
The inverted U-shaped relationship between fertility rate and income is typical of
most economies. The left hand side of Fig. 6 depicts the general fertility rate 19, i.e.
the number of births divided by the number of women aged 15-44, for some European
countries in the period 1750 − 1920, The right hand side of Fig. 6 depicts the general
19General fertility is an index of the rate of production of children, strongly correlated with the average
number of children per women (see, for example, Livi Bacci, 2007)
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fertility rate adjusted by the probability of surviving at 20. We are interested in the
number of surviving children at 20 since parents maximize their utility with respect to
the number of surviving children.
As depicted in Fig. 6 the general fertility rate, for most countries, increases at low levels
of income and starts to decline when income is sufficiently high. However, in agreement
with the theoretical predictions, the inverted U-shaped relationship between fertility and
income is much more evident when we consider the number of surviving children.
A large body of literature has developed theoretical and empirical models to analyze
this path of fertility. Becker (1960)’s seminal work argues that the main reason behind
the decline in fertility was the considerable increase in income which occurred as a result
of the Industrial Revolution. In particular, as income increases the number of children
in a household decreases because more aﬄuent consumers tend to choose activities which
require less time, instead children require a great deal of time and energy. Moreover,
richer parents choose to have fewer children so that they can dedicate more time and
resources to increase the “quality ”of their offspring.
However, as is apparent from Fig. 6, the fact that the level of income which reverses
the relationship between fertility and income differs across countries, suggests that there
are also other specific country factors which affect the relationship between fertility and
income.
In this respect Clark writes “Income, however, certainly cannot by itself explain the
modern decline in fertility....Had income alone been determining fertility, the rich in the
preindustrial world would already have been restricting their fertility ”(see Clark, 2007,
p. 293).
According to Clark high fertility even among the rich, in the preindustrial period, could
be either due to the absence of birth control or to the fact that, in the high mortality
environment of the Malthusian era, people consciously had more children in the hope of
achieving a desired family size of two or three surviving children and most particularly,
in richer families, a surviving son.
Thus, to explain the fertility decline we need to consider other factors beyond income,
such as conscious action to limit fertility, the reduction of child mortality and the increased
social status of women (see among others Livi Bacci, 2007, Easterlin, 2004).
V. A Quantitative Evaluation of the Model for the UK from 1541-1914
In this section we discuss the capacity of the model to reproduce the dynamics of
the UK economy in the period 1541 − 1914. For the purposes of our paper, the UK
represents the best country because of i) the availability of long-term time series on
population, health, GDP per capita, output composition, etc.; ii) many scholars argue
that its advances in technological progress and health appear of the type assumed in our
model (see Section II., and, e.g., Allen, 2009, Mathias, 2001, Mokyr, 2010); and, finally, iii)
the implicit assumptions made in the theoretical model of the absence of any government
activity and of a closed economy fit with the facts that the Industrial Revolution in the
UK happened without any “conscious government policy sponsoring industrial progress
’and any role for imported capital (see Mathias, 2001, p. 4).
Fig. 7 provides a synthetic picture of the transition from stagnation to modern growth
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Figure 6: General Fertility rate versus Income. Europe: 1750-1930. Nonparametric kernel
smoother. Sources: GDP per capita from Maddison Project Database (MPD) (update
02/2013); General fertility rate from the Human Mortality Database (HMD) (update
02/2013).
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through three different regimes developed in our theoretical framework; in particular, in
accordance with a large amount of literature on the issue (see, e.g., Cipolla, 1962, Galor,
2005, Clark, 2007, Livi Bacci, 2007) we will assume that the transition from the Malthusian
to the Pre-Modern Regimes in the UK took place between 1770 and 1800 (the red column
reported in Fig. 7); and the transition from the Pre-Modern to the Modern Regime
between 1820 and 1850 (the blue column reported in Fig. 7).
The left panel shows how (smoothed) GDP per capita and GDP per worker display the
same pattern (see Appendix C for the methodology used to calculate the GDP per worker).
Until the middle of the 1600s stagnation was the dominant characteristic; afterwards a
period of sustained growth started, with an acceleration at the end of the 18th century;
GDP per worker continued to increase up to 1914, even though at a decelerated rate
after 1890 (see Fig. 8 below). The acceleration of growth at the end of the 19th century
coincides with a strong change in output structure, highlighted by the deep fall in the
labor share in the agricultural sector and the land share in national income (see the second
panel in Fig. 7). Accelerating growth rates, changes in output composition in favor of the
modern sector and the fall in the fertility rate are (as shown in Fig. 7) coherent with the
theoretical predictions of our model for the transition from Malthusian to Pre-Modern
Regimes (see Fig. 5). Finally, the timing of the spur in the primary enrollment rate in
1850 as displayed in the right panel of Fig. 7 agrees with the assumed period of transition
from Pre-Modern to Modern Regimes (see also Clark, 2007, p. 179).
V.A. Variables and Settings Used in the Quantitative Exercise
Table 1 lists the variables used in the quantitative exercise, the observed variables
used to calculate them and the sources.
Variable Definition Calculated by Source
la Labor share in the traditional
sector
Labor shares in agricultural
sector
IHS, Broadberry et al. (2013)
pL Employment Cohorts age 20-70 and unem-
ployment rate
W&S, HMD, and IHS
y GDP per worker GDP per capita, employment,
and population
MPD, W&S
p Probability of surviving from
20 to 70 years old
Cohorts age 20 and 70 W&S and IHS
n Number of surviving children
at adulthood
Employment and probability
of surviving from 20 to 70
years old
W&S and HMD
Table 1: Time series used in the quantitative evaluation of the model. Sources: Maddison
Project Database (MPD) (update 02/2013); Human Mortality Database (HMD) (up-
date 02/2013), International Historical Statistics (IHS) (update 04/2013), Wrigley and
Schofield (1989) (W&S)
.
As discussed in Appendix C the calculation of the parameters’ model required a set
of additional information on the values taken by labor share on total output, minimum
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Figure 7: Transition from stagnation to modern growth: UK (England and Wales), 1541-
1914. The red bar indicates the transition from Malthusian to Pre-Modern Regimes (1770-
1800), while the blue bar the transition from Pre-Modern to Modern Regimes (1820-1850).
26 Davide Fiaschi - Tamara Fioroni
level of GDP per capita, investment rate at the beginning of the Modern Regime (set to
1850 for our exercise), and real interest rate in the Modern Regime (see again Appendix
C for more details). Table 3 reports these values and their respective sources.
Parameter/variables Definition Value Source
1− λ, 1− α Labor share on total output 0.6 Clark (2007), Hansen and Prescott
(2002), Allen (2009)
yp.c.min Minimum level of GDP per capita
(1990 International GK $)
0.67 MPD
i1850 Investment rate in 1850 0.09 IHS
r1914 Real interest rate in 1914 1.045 Bank of England
Table 2: Additional information needed to calculate the parameters’ model. Sources:
MPD, IHS, and Bank of England
.
Table 3 reports the result of the calibration of the two models specification, i.e. ex-
ogenous and endogenous fertility.
Parameter Definition Exogenous fertility Endogenous fertility
cmin Subsistence consumption 2.857 2.857
T˜ Fixed factor in traditional technology 14.964 14.964
β Altruism factor 0.578 0.636
θ Transfer factor 10.575 5.063
γ Return to education 0.302 0.402
D Scale parameter in education 7.438 5.588
ϵ Taste for children 0.607
δ Cost parameter of raising children 0.462
Table 3: Model’s parameters calculated to match data for the UK reported in Tables 1
and 2
cmin and T˜ have exactly the same values for both models because in their calculation
preferences for fertility are not present (see Eqq. (see Eqq. (100 and 102)) in Appendix
C). The return on education is higher in the case of endogenous fertility, but balanced by
a lower scale parameter in the production function of education. The cost parameter of
raising children to 20 years old appears very high (46% of income of parents’ is devoted
to this factor). However, this cost should also include the consumption of children; with
a children’s consumption equal to 50% of adults, the opportunity cost of raising children
sharply decreases to 19% of income (see Appendix C)
V.B. Growth Accounting
In this section we run a growth accounting exercise to quantify the role of technological
progress and adult mortality in the overall growth of GDP per worker in the UK in the
period 1541-1914.
From Eq. (14) the growth rate of technological progress is given by:
gA = gy − gp + αgpL + αgl
a
(54)
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where gA ≡ At+1/At − 1, g
y ≡ yt+1/yt − 1, g
p
t+1 ≡ pt+1/pt − 1, g
pL ≡ pt+1Lt+1/ptLt − 1
and gl
a
≡ lat+1/l
a
t − 1 are respectively the growth rate of technological progress, GDP per
worker, surviving workforce, employment and labor share in the traditional sector. The
calculation of the growth rate of technological progress is therefore the same for both
theoretical models.
Fig. 8 reports the individual contribution of technological progress, surviving work-
force, employment, and factor accumulation to the growth rate of GDP per worker gy,
i.e. gA, gp, −αgpL and −αgl
a
respectively.
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Figure 8: Growth accounting for the UK from 1541 to 1914. Contribution of different
factor to GDP per worker’s growth. The red bar indicates the transition from Malthusian
to Pre-Modern Regimes (1770-1800), while the blue bar the transition from Pre-Modern
to Modern Regimes (1820-1850).
In the Malthusian Regime (1541-1800) the growth of GDP per worker (0.24% per
annum) strictly followed the growth rate of technological progress (0.39%), with a first
phase up to the middle of the seventeenth century where the negative check of the growth
of employment overshadowed the increasing positive growth of technological progress;
and a second phase with a limited growth rate of employment (negative at the end of the
seventeenth century), which allowed the growth rate of technological progress to benefit
the growth of GDP per worker the most (Broadberry et al., 2010 and Broadberry et al.,
2010). Changes in adult survival (the share of surviving workforce) instead, had a very
limited effect.
In the Pre-Modern Regime (1800-1850) the growth rate of GDP per worker (0.52%)
strongly accelerated thanks to the increase in the growth rate of technological progress
(0.74%), but a remarkable contribution was given by factor accumulation (in particular
fixed capital ), and less by adult survival (0.24% and 0.074% respectively); the strong
growth of employment (-0.54%) only partially dampened the upward trend of the growth
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rate of GDP per worker.
Growth of y Due to growth in Growth of yp.c.
Period A p pL la
1541− 1800 0.24% 0.39 0.018 −0.17 0 0.22
1800− 1850 0.52% 0.74 0.074 −0.54 0.24 0.53
1850− 1914 0.99% 0.34 0.40 −0.43 0.67 0.97
Table 4: The table shows growth rates per year for GDP per capita and GDP per worker.
The entries for A, p, pL and la are respectively the contributions of growth of technological
progress, surviving workforce, employment, and factor accumulation to the growth in GDP
per worker (i.e. the entries for pL and la are the annual growth rates multiplied by the
capital share on total output (α)).
Finally, in the Modern Regime (1850-1914) technological progress progressively con-
tributed less and less (0.34%), while factor accumulation (fixed capital, but overall human
capital) and adult survival reached the peak of their contribution to the growth of GDP
per worker (0.67% and 0.40% respectively). The growth of GDP per worker increased
until the end of the nineteenth century, and then strongly declined (see Mathias, 2001).
For the period 1760-1860 our estimates of the growth rate of technological progress
display the same inverted U-shaped path of Antras and Voth, 2003, but with generally
slightly higher values.20 This contrasts with another strand of literature, which finds an
accelerating growth rate in that period (see, e.g., Table 1 in Allen, 2009, and Table 7.1 in
Temin and Voth, 2013)
Finally, for the period 1860-1900 Allen (2009) (Table 1) provides an estimate of growth
rate of A substantially higher than ours (0.89% versus 0.40%): this difference can be traced
to his higher estimated growth rate of GDP per worker, but overall to his exclusion from
production factors of human capital.
Fig. 9 reports the estimated trajectories of technological progress and the share of
surviving workforce calculated for the two models of exogenous and endogenous fertility,
and the thresholds of technological progress for the transitions across regimes ATRA and
APRE−MOD. In both cases Malthusian and Pre-Modern Regimes were characterized by a
strong increase in technological progress, and by very limited changes in adult survival.
On the contrary, in the Modern Regime technological progress displays limited increments,
and it is the surge in adult survival that played the prominent role by far. In summary,
“technical progress was the prime mover behind the industrial revolution”(Allen, 2009, p.
1), while the decline in adult mortality appears to be one of the main reasons for modern
growth (see Easterlin, 2004, p. 85).
V.C. The Model’s Simulation
The model is simulated under the assumptions that childhood has a length of 20 years,
adulthood has a length of 50 years (workforce is therefore made up of people between the
20Antras and Voth, 2003’s estimates of the annual growth rate of technological progress (TFP) for the
periods 1760-1800, 1801-1831, and 1831-1860 are equal to 0.27%, 0.54%, and 0.33%, while our estimates
equal to 0.52%, 0.85% and 0.51% respectively.
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Figure 9: The estimated trajectory of technological progress and the share of surviving
workforce in the UK from 1541 to 1914, and the thresholds of technological progress for
the transitions across regimes ATRA and APRE−MOD.
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ages of 20 and 70), and that each time period has a length of 30 years. We start from the
simulation of the model with exogenous fertility.
V.C.i. Exogenous Fertility
Eq. (36) is the base of the simulation for the case with exogenous fertility. Figure 10
displays the results of the simulation of GDP per worker with the parameters reported in
Table 3.
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Figure 10: Observed (black) versus simulated (red) GDP per worker of UK for the period
1541-1914. Violet points are the minimum level of GDP per worker ymin, green points
are the thresholds of GDP per worker ycap to move to the Pre-Modern Regime, and blue
points the thresholds yedu to move to the Modern Regime.
The model accurately reproduces the actual path of GDP per worker, with the tim-
ing of transitions across regimes perfectly matched. Given the assumption of exogenous
fertility, the capacity of the model to replicate the observed pattern of growth should be
evaluated only by focusing on the Pre-Modern and Modern Regimes, where the endoge-
nous accumulation of fixed and human capital is one source of growth. In the Traditional
Regime, instead, the method used to calculate A directly drives to the equality between
observed and simulated GDP per worker.
The time path of the accumulation of fixed and human capital reported in Fig. (11)
confirms the timing of transition across different regimes. The decreasing consumption
rate (the ratio between consumption and income) after 1800 mirrors the increasing transfer
rate (the ratio between transfer and income); such transfers are firstly devoted to the
accumulation of fixed capital, and only after 1820 to the accumulation of human capital
(the education rate, i.e. the ratio between education expenditure and income, increases
over time peaking at 8% in 1914). The simulated saving rate in 1820 is almost equal
to the observed one (orange point in the picture). Real interest rate increases over time
thanks to the increments in technological progress and the accumulation of human capital,
Transition to Modern Growth 31
1550 1600 1650 1700 1750 1800 1850 1900
0.
70
0.
85
1.
00
Year
Co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
ra
te
1550 1600 1650 1700 1750 1800 1850 1900
0.
00
0.
15
0.
30
Year
Be
qu
es
t r
a
te
1550 1600 1650 1700 1750 1800 1850 1900
0.
00
0.
10
0.
20
Year
Sa
vi
ng
 ra
te
1550 1600 1650 1700 1750 1800 1850 1900
0.
00
0.
04
0.
08
Year
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
ra
te
1550 1600 1650 1700 1750 1800 1850 1900
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8
1.
2
Year
Ph
ys
ica
l c
ap
ita
l p
er
 w
o
rk
e
r
1550 1600 1650 1700 1750 1800 1850 1900
1.
0
1.
2
1.
4
Year
H
um
an
 c
ap
ita
l p
er
 w
o
rk
e
r
1550 1600 1650 1700 1750 1800 1850 1900
1.
00
1.
02
1.
04
Year
An
nu
a
l r
ea
l i
nt
er
es
t r
a
te
1550 1600 1650 1700 1750 1800 1850 1900
0.
2
0.
6
1.
0
Year
La
bo
r s
ha
re
 in
 th
e 
tra
d.
 s
ec
to
r
Figure 11: Time path of the main variables of the model (black points), and of relative
observed values where available (orange points).
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stabilizing at around 4% at the end of the period (slightly below the interest rate observed
in 1914). Finally, the dynamics of output composition proxied by the labor share in the
traditional sector appears completely replicated by the model.
Overall the dynamics of variables appear credible, with the exception of the level of
the saving rate, which peaks at 20% at the end of the period (instead, the observed
saving/investment rate is about 9% on average with no evidence of trend, see Fig. 22).
We will see that the simulation with endogenous fertility provides a partial correction to
this feature.
V.C.ii. Endogenous Fertility
Fig. 12 shows how in the case of endogenous fertility the replication of observed
GDP per worker is not as perfect as the one of exogenous fertility, in particular for the
Malthusian Regime. The overestimate of GDP per worker up to the end of the eighteenth
century is caused by the underestimate of employment, which is, in turn, the outcome
of the difference between the simulated and observed annual fertility rate (see Fig. 13).
When, around 1800, the observed and simulated employment again become very close,
the same happens for the GDP per worker. After 1800, the differences between simulated
and observed fertility appear less marked, and, overall, the dynamics of GDP per capita
in that period strongly depend more on the factor accumulation and less on employment
growth.
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Figure 12: Observed (black) versus simulated (red) GDP per worker of the UK for the
period 1541-1914. Violet points are the minimum level of GDP per worker ymin, green
points are the thresholds of GDP per worker ycap to move to the Pre-Modern Regime, and
blue points the thresholds yedu to move to the Modern Regime. The green bar indicates
the transition to a consumption above the subsistence level.
The timing of transition from Pre-Modern to Modern Regimes is the one expected,
while the transition from Malthusian to Pre-Modern Regime happens about 30 years
before we expected.
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Figure 13: Observed (black) versus simulated (red) employment and annual fertility rate
(surviving children at 20 years) of the UK for the period 1541-1914.
As expected, the consumption rate appears to decrease over time (see Fig. 14); until
the end of the eighteenth century this decline is the outcome of a constant consumption
at subsistence level and of an increasing GDP per worker; in particular, the not-consumed
resources are devoted to increase fertility (see 13). The decline of the consumption rate
after 1800 is motivated by the increasing saving and education rates; simulated saving
rates, differently from the exogenous fertility case, display a more plausible pattern. Fi-
nally, the simulated real interest rate in 1914 closely matches the observed one, as well as
the dynamics of labor share in the traditional sector.
The main drawback of the endogenous fertility case seems, indeed, to be that of the
fertility choices of individuals. While the decreasing trend in fertility starting around
1800 is well captured (apart from a slight lag in the observed turning point of the fertility
rate), the dynamics before 1800 seem hard to replicate with the actual theoretical model.
VI. Concluding Remarks
This paper contributes to the literature on the role of mortality reduction on economic
growth by accounting for its differential effects during the various regimes of economic de-
velopment. The rise in technological progress always favors the transition from a Malthu-
sian to a Modern Regime. Instead, the mortality decline can have opposite effects on the
transition. At low levels of income such reduction can impede the transition or, worse,
push back an economy to Malthusian Regime. This result is driven by the presence of
a fixed factor of production (land) in the traditional sector, which implies diminishing
returns of labor. A decrease in mortality in Pre-Modern Regime, indeed, increasing the
workforce, pushes the income of workers downward, and, finally, leading to a decrease in
the intergeneration transfer of resources (in the worst case of no transfers the economy
returns to a Malthusian Regime). On the contrary, at high levels of income it favors the
transition, by fostering investment in fixed and human capital. The presence of endoge-
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Figure 14: Time path of the main variables of the model (black points), and of relative
observed values when available (orange points).
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nous fertility dampens the effects analyzed above but does not qualitatively change the
key findings.
The quantitative exercise shows that the model, when fertility is exogenous, is able to
reproduce the observed transition from stagnation to growth. By simulating the model,
indeed, we show that the long-run behavior of income per worker follows the empirical
evidence. By contrast, the model with endogenous fertility partially reproduces the ob-
served path of income per worker and fertility. This result suggests the need for a more
complex theory of fertility to take into account the possible natural and social constraints
on theoretical fertility.
Finally, the introduction of endogenous mortality should not affect the qualitative
results of the paper but should merely add a possible self-reinforcing mechanism to the
transition from stagnation to growth. In particular, some authors argue that the acqui-
sition of human capital has the side-effect of increasing the diffusion of the best practises
in personal hygiene, leading, in particular, to a fall in infant mortality (Easterlin, 2004;
Mokyr, 1993; Ljungberg, 2013).
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A Optimal Choices
AA. Exogenous Fertility
The individual’s maximization problem is given:
(c∗t , b
∗
t ) = argmax
ct,bt
{pt[(1− β) log(ct) + β log(bt + θ)]}, (55)
subject to:
yt = ptct + ptbt;
ct ≥ c
min;
bt ≥ 0.
The Lagrangian for problem (55) is given by:
L = p
[
(1− β) log
(
yt − ptbt
pt
)
+ β log(bt + θ)
]
+ λbt + µ
(
yt − ptbt
pt
− cmin
)
(56)
and the first order conditions are:
∂L
∂bt
= pt
[
−
(1− β)pt
yt − ptbt
+
β
bt + θ
]
+ λ− µ = 0.
λbt = 0
µ
(
yt − ptbt
p
− cmin
)
= 0
Thus we can have different cases:
1. ct = c
min and bt = 0.
2. ct > c
min and bt = 0. Thus we have that ct =
yt
pt
. This implies that ct > c
min if
yt > ptc
min.
3. ct > c
min and bt > 0. Thus solving the first order conditions we get:
c∗t =
(1− β)(yt + ptθ)
pt
(57)
b∗t =
βyt − θ(1− β)pt
pt
(58)
4. We do not consider the case ct = c
min and bt > 0.
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AB. Endogenous Fertility
When fertility is endogenous the agent’s maximization problem is given:
(c∗t , b
∗
t , n
∗
t ) = argmax
ct,bt,nt
{pt[(1− β) log(ct) + ϵ log(nt) + β log(bt + θ)]}, (59)
subject to:
yt = δytnt + ptct + ptbt;
ct ≥ c
min;
and
bt ≥ 0.
The Lagrangian for this optimization problem is given as follows:
L = pt
[
(1− β) log ct + ϵ log
(
yt − pt(ct + bt)
δyt
)
+ β log(bt + θ)
]
+λbt+µ (ct − c
min) (60)
and the first order conditions are:
∂L
∂ct
=
(1− β)
ct
−
ϵpt
yt − pt(ct + bt)
+ µ = 0. (61)
∂L
∂bt
= −
ϵpt
yt − pt(ct + bt)
+
β
bt + θ
+ λ = 0. (62)
λbt = 0
µ (ct − c
min) = 0
Thus we can have different cases:
1. ct = c
min and bt = 0. Thus given ct = c
min, from the budget constraint we get:
n∗t =
yt − ptc
min
δyt
(63)
2. ct > c
min and bt = 0. Given that µ = 0, we solve the first order condition (61) with
respect to ct:
c∗t =
(1− β)yt
(1− β + ϵ)
(64)
Substituting this solution into the budget constraint, the optimal number of children,
is given by:
n∗t =
ϵ
δ(1− β + ϵ)
(65)
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3. ct > c
min and bt > 0 Thus given µ = 0 and λ = 0, from the first order conditions
(61), (62) and the budget constraint we get:
c∗t =
(1− β)(yt + ptθ)
1 + ϵ
(66)
b∗t =
βyt − θ(1− β + ϵ)pt
1 + ϵ
(67)
n∗t =
ϵ(yt + θpt)
δ(1 + ϵ)yt
(68)
4. We do not consider the case ct = c
min and bt > 0.
AC. Optimal Education
The maximization of Eq. (31) yields the following solution for the optimal education:
e¯t
∗ =


0 if b¯t ∈ [0, b˜];
b¯t − b˜
1 +Db˜
if b¯t ∈ (b˜,∞)
(69)
where:
b˜ ≡
α
D(1− α)γ
. (70)
From Eqq.(30) and (69) the level of income such that b¯t = b˜, when fertility is exogenous,
is given as follows:
yedu ≡
b˜nt + θ(1− β)pt
β
(71)
When fertility is endogenous, yedu is calculated using Eq. (43):
yedu ≡
b˜(1 + ϵ) + θ(1− β + ϵ)pt
β
. (72)
AD. Thresholds
From Eqq. (13) when production is conducted using traditional technology per-worker
income at time t+ 1 is given by:
yt+1 = At+1p
1−α
t+1
(
T˜
Lt+1
)α
(73)
Thus, from Eq. (22), income per worker when production is conducted using tradi-
tional technology ensures an income at least equal to the subsistence level (i.e. ptc
min)
if:
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At+1p
1−α
t+1
(
T˜
Lt
)α
≥ ptc
min (74)
which implies that:
At+1 ≥ A
min ≡
ptc
min
pt+1
(
pt+1Lt+1
T˜
)α
. (75)
If p and L are constant over time we get:
Amin ≡ cmin
(
pL
T˜
)α
. (76)
B Proof Proposition 1
In what follows we assume that pt+1 = pt = p, Lt+1 = Lt = L (thus nt = 1).
From Eq.(36) when yt ∈ (y
edu,∞), :
∂yt+1
∂yt
=
At+1p
1−ααβ
nt
[
B(C +Qyt − F )
−
α
γ + b˜(C +Qyt − F )
1−γ
]α−1
, (77)
where for simplicity we set B = T˜ /L, C = 1/(1 + Db˜) Q = Dβ/(1 + Db˜), F =
θ(1− β)p/(1 +Db˜). From Eq.(77), simple calculations show that:
lim
yt→∞
∂yt+1
∂yt
= 0. (78)
Given this condition, the economy shows one stable equilibrium in the Traditional Regime
and possibly one unstable and one stable equilibrium in the Pre-Modern Regime if the
following conditions hold:
lim
yt→ycap
yt+1 ≤ y
cap (79)
lim
yt→yedu
yt+1 ≤ y
edu. (80)
• The first condition holds if At+1 < A
tra:
Atra ≡
θ(1− β)
β
(
pL
T˜
)α
(81)
where Amin < Atra if assumption 21 holds.
• The second condition holds if:
A ≤ Apre-mod ≡
b˜+ θ(1− β)pα
βp1−α
(
T˜
L
+ b˜
)α (82)
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where limp→0A
pre-mod =∞ and ∂Apre-mod/∂p < 0 if:
p < pT =
(1− α)b˜
θ(1− β)α
. (83)
An economy shows one stable equilibrium in the Pre-Modern Regime if:
lim
yt→ycap
yt+1 ≥ y
cap, (84)
lim
yt→yedu
yt+1 ≤ y
edu, (85)
• The first condition holds if A ≥ Atra
• The second condition holds if A ≤ Apre-mod
An economy shows one stable equilibrium in the Modern Regime if:
lim
yt→ycap
yt+1 ≥ y
cap, (86)
lim
yt→yedu
yt+1 ≥ y
edu, (87)
• The first condition holds if A > Atra
• The second and third conditions hold if A > Apre-mod
C Quantitative Exercise
CA. Details on Table 1
All variables are estimated using a nonparametric method. In what follows we describe
the procedures used to compute the variables listed in Table 1.
• The labor share in the traditional sector lat is estimated using the data on the labor
share in the agricultural sector from Broadberry et al. (2013) for the period 1700
to 1851. For the period 1852-1914 the data is taken from the IHS. In particular,
we adjust the data on the labor share in the agricultural sector to match the labor
share in our model which is set equal to one until the end of the Malthusian Regime
(i.e. 1800, see the black curve in Fig. 15). This assumption is supported by the
pattern of the land share in national income which is nearly constant until the end
of the eighteenth century and then start to decline. The data on the land share in
the traditional sector are taken from Clark (2010).
• The employment pL. The labor force, according to theoretical model is given by
people between the ages of 20 and 70 (i.e. Pop20−70t ) and it is adjusted to take
into account both the unemployment rate and the fact that some individuals do
not belong to the labor force (15%) (see Fig. 16). In particular, the population
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Figure 15: labor share in the traditional sector (black curve) and land share on national
income (red curve).
between the ages 20 and 70 for the period 1541− 1851, is calculated using the data
on cohorts from Wrigley and Schofield (1989), and for the period 1851− 1914, the
data from the IHS.
Regarding the unemployment rate the first data available dates from 1855. Thus,
the unemployment rate in the period 1541 to 1854 is assumed equal to the average
unemployment rate for the period 1855 − 1880. From 1855 to 1914, instead, we
consider a smoothed unemployment rate. Fig.16 shows the results of our estimate
for total employment.
• The GDP per worker yt is calculated using the data on income per capita, i.e. y
p.c
t ,
from MP (2014). In particular the data until 1850 is for England and Wales only,
and after 1850 is for the United Kingdom (defined as England, Wales and Scotland).
In particular GDP per worker is calculated as:
yt =
yp.ct L
TOT
t
ptLt
, (88)
where LTOTt is the observed total population. The data on L
TOT
t is taken, for the
period 1541 to 1850 (England and Wales) from Wrigley and Schofield (1989) and,
for the period 1850 to 1914 (England, Wales and Scotland) from the IHS.
• The probability of surviving from 20 to 70 years p, is calculated as the ratio between
the population 70 years old in a given period (for example 1591), i.e. Pop70t+1, and
the population 20 years old 50 years before (for example 1541),i.e. Pop20t :
pˆ =
Pop70t+50
Pop20t
(89)
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Figure 16: Employment 1541-1914
The data for the period 1541 to 1821 is taken from Wrigley and Schofield (1989)
and for the later period (England, Wales and Scotland) from the IHS and HMD (see
Fig. 17).
The green curve in Fig. 17 represents the adjusted adult survival rate in order to
have a smoothed adult survival for the whole period.
If we consider that the workforce is given by cohorts between the ages of 20 and
70, then a more careful definition of p implies that it could be considered as the
share of the surviving workforce. Thus to compute this variable we use the following
procedure.
We assume to have 50 cohorts of individuals in the range of age 20− 50 and that in
each period L˜ new individuals reach 20 years old. If we define as ρ the probability
of a 20 year old agent of surviving to the next year, the total observed population
in the range of age 20− 50 is:
Pop20−70 = ρL˜+ ρ2L˜+ ...+ ρ50L˜, (90)
i.e.:
Pop20−70 = ρL˜
(
1− ρ50
1− ρ
)
. (91)
Thus if ρ = 1 (i.e. no deaths in adulthood) we have the maximum workforce:
Max Pop20−70 = 50L˜. (92)
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Figure 17: Adult Survival.
The ratio between Pop20−70 and Max Pop20−70 measures the impact of adult mor-
tality on the size of the workforce:
Pop20−70
Max Pop20−70
=
ρ
50
(
1− ρ50
1− ρ
)
. (93)
As specified above the probability of surviving from 20 to 70 is given:
pˆ =
Pop70
Pop20
=
ρ50L˜
ρL˜
= ρ49. (94)
Therefore, the ratio between Pop20−70 and Max Pop20−70 has a (strong) concave
relationship with pˆ:
Pop20−70
Max Pop20−70
=
pˆ1/49
50
(
1− pˆ50/49
1− pˆ1/49
)
. (95)
If we consider an arbitrary q number of cohorts (e.g. every 1 month) then:
Pop20−70
Max Pop20−70
=
pˆ1/(q−1)
q
(
1− pˆq/(q−1)
1− pˆ1/(q−1)
)
. (96)
In the limit of q →∞ (i.e. the continuous time case) the share of surviving workforce
is given by:
Pop20−70
Max Pop20−70
=
pˆ− 1
log(pˆ)
. (97)
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Figure 18: Estimated adult survival vs the share of surviving workforce
Fig.(18) shows the path of the probability of surviving from 20 to 70 and of the
share of surviving workforce.
• Fertility nt, using Eq. (28) can be calculated as the growth rate of employment,
that is:
nt =
pt+1Lt+1
ptLt
pt
pt+1
(98)
where pL is the employment calculated as specified before.
In Fig.(19) we compare the fertility rate calculated as the growth rate of employment
and the fertility rate calculated as the growth rate of total population between age
15− 24:
CB. Details on Table 2
• labor share on total output 1− α = 0.6 is chosen to be equal to its average value in
the period 1541 − 1914 (see red line in Fig. 20). Moreover, Clark (2007) (p.138),
Hansen and Prescott (2002), Allen (2009) use the same value.
• The minimum level of GDP per capita set equal to 0.67 is chosen close to the value
of 0.6 (in thousands of 1990 international GK $) as reported in the MPD for England
in year 1 .
• The real interest rate in 1914 is set equal to 4.5% according to the estimates of the
Bank of England as shown in Fig. 21.21
21According (Mathias, 2001, p. 133) the interest rate in the nineteen century was about 5% for personal
loans and businessmen.
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Figure 19: Fertility rate
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Figure 20: Wage share in national income in 1541 − 1914. Source: Clark (2010, Tables
13, 34)
.
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Figure 21: Nominal interest rates and inflation rates in UK in 1900-
2008. Source:http://www.economicshelp.org/wp-content/uploads/blog-
uploads/2012/01/inflation-interest-rates-1900-2011.png
• The investment rate i = 0.09 in 1850 is set equal to its average value in the period
1840− 1900 as shown in Fig. 22.
CC. Details on parameters’calculation reported in Table 3
Henceforth CAP denotes the year in which the economy enters the Pre-Modern regime
(i.e. 1800) and EDU the year in which the economy enters the modern regime (i.e. 1850).
• Subsistence Consumption. To calculate the subsistence consumption cmin we first
calculate the minimum level of GDP per worker ymin. It is calculated from the value
of minimum GDP per capita and the ratio population/employment in 1541, i.e.:
ymin ≡
yp.c.minL
tot
1541
p1541L1541
(99)
The subsistence consumption is thus given as:
cmin =
ymin
pmin
(100)
• Fixed factor in traditional technology. From Eq. (11) T˜ can be calculated as a
function of b˜ since in the transition’s year from the Pre-Modern Regime to Modern
Regime, i.e. EDU = 1850, kt+1 = k1850 = b˜. Thus we first calculate b˜ as a function
of the investment rate, income per worker and fertility in 1850:
b˜ =
i1850y1850
n1850
, (101)
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Figure 22: Fixed capital formation in UK in 1830-1914. Source: IHS (update 4/2013)
thus:
T˜ = b˜L1850
(
la
1850
1− la
1850
)
, (102)
CC.i. Exogenous Fertility
• Altruism factor. From Eqq. (25) and (33) β can be calculated as follows:
β =
b˜nedu
yedu −
ycappedu
pcap
. (103)
• Bequest factor. From Eqq. (25) and (103) the parameter θ can be calculated as
follows:
θ =
ycapβ
(1− β)pcap
. (104)
• Return to education. To compute the parameter γ we use the value of the real
interest rate in 1914. In particular from Eqq. (4) and (13) we get:
ht+1 =


(
yt+1
At+1p
1−α
t+1
)1/α
− T˜
Lt+1
pt+1(1− lat+1)
(
αAt+1
rt+1
)1/(1−α)


α
. (105)
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From eqq. (17), (32) and (34), ht+1 it is also given as follows:
ht+1 =
{
γb˜(1− α)nt + α[βyt − θ(1− β)pt]
b˜nt[(1− α)γ + α]
}γ
. (106)
Thus substituting all variables at time t+1 = 1914 and at time t = 1880 (remember
that the length of a generation is 30 years) in Eqq. (105) and (110) we can compute
the parameter γ.
• Scale parameter in education. The scale parameter D is then calculated using
Eq.(34):
D =
α
b˜(1− α)γ
(107)
CC.ii. Endogenous fertility
• Altruism factor. From Eqq. (45), (46), (51), β can be calculated as follows:
β =
b˜ysub/psubcmin
yedu − ycappedu/pcap + b˜(ysub − psubcmin)/psubcmin
(108)
• Bequest factor. From Eqq. (46) and (108) the parameter θ can be calculated as
follows:
θ =
ycapβ
(1− β + ϵ)pcap
. (109)
• Return to education. To compute the parameter γ we use the value of the real inter-
est rate in 1914. In particular, we use Eq. (105) and the human capital production
function given as follows:
ht+1 =
{
γb˜(1− α)nt(1 + ϵ) + α[βyt − θ(1− β + ϵ)p]
b˜(1 + ϵ)nt[(1− α)γ + α]
}γ
. (110)
where nt is given by Eq. (44).
• Taste for children. From Eqq. (45) and (108) the parameter ϵ is calculated as
follows:
ϵ =
(1− β)(ysub − psubcmin)
psubcmin
. (111)
• Cost parameter of raising children. The parameter δ is calculated using the equilib-
rium level of income in the Malthusian regime (1690). Thus from Eq. (47):
δ = 1−
pcmin
yMAL
(112)
A more careful definition of the cost of raising children should also include their
consumption. In other words, at the Malthusian equilibrium (i.e. n = 1):
ymin = cmin + δ¯ymin + ηcmin (113)
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where η is the fraction of parent’s minimum consumption as consumed by children.
Thus δymin = δ¯ymin + ηcmin. Therefore if we include the consumption of children we
get:
δ¯ = 1−
(1 + η)cmin
ymin
. (114)
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